Slithering to the wrong kind of union
By Otmar Issing
The crisis of European economic and monetary union seems to confirm a long-standing belief that monetary union cannot survive without political union. I belonged to a group that argued that the euro should have been preceded – or at least accompanied – by political union. Many observers are now interpreting the European Union’s manifold financial rescue measures to support Greece as a step in the direction of political union. Therefore, should people like me not be happy with this development?
In fact, the opposite is true. Connecting the initial idea of a political union with developments currently under way is both logically flawed and politically dangerous. In short: a consistent concept of a political union should be based on a constitution, and imply a European government controlled by a European Parliament, elected according to democratic principles.
What we see happening now is something quite different. More and more national taxpayers’ money is now at risk to “save” the euro. Yet the conclusion that this process is leading in the direction of political union is derived from the strict conditions imposed upon member states that broke the rules, in exchange for help – conditions which imply a kind of European control over elements of member state governments.
If these conditions do trigger reforms – which in many countries is long overdue – that would be welcome. However, the fact that a member country can be assured that its membership of the euro – even in the case of permanent violations of the rules – will be saved at any price causes moral hazard and creates an obvious potential for blackmail.
The decisions taken at the last European crisis summit on July 21 greatly extended the powers of the European Financial Stability Facility and brought new help for Greece. This increase European involvement in domestic policymaking. But this is not a move in the direction of a true political union. It is a dangerous step, and one which will end up dividing Europe.
Most observers rightly interpret this increasing shared fiscal liability as a step in the direction of a European common bond. The idea of issuing bonds which all member states of the eurozone guarantee insofar seems sensible, as it would immediately lower interest rates for the highly indebted countries. However, there is a problem too, given it would also lead to higher interest rates for those countries that enjoyed credibility with financial markets in the past. Those who claim that this effect would be small succumb either to an illusion or deliberately underestimate this risk. Considering the amount of debt which over time would become “common” for each country, it is hard to overestimate the interest risk for the hitherto responsible debtors.
A common bond would also immediately relieve some countries of their burden of a record of fiscal irresponsibility. A stronger case of free riding can hardly be imagined. Lack of fiscal discipline is rewarded, while fiscal solidity is punished. The implied transfer of taxpayers’ money would also take place without the involvement of national parliaments – a clear violation of the fundamental democratic principle of “no taxation without representation”.
Suggestions as to how one might control and limit the issuance of such bonds are unconvincing. Almost all treaties promising European fiscal discipline have been broken time and again. The worst example was delivered by France and Germany in 2002-03, when they violated the Stability and Growth Pact, and even organised a political majority against the application of its rules.
All efforts to strengthen the pact are of course highly welcome. However, the bad experience since the start of Emu, but also any analysis of the implied incentives in the political process, deliver a clear message: political control of national fiscal policies from the European level will always be compromised by different interests. The idea that a new European process to transfer taxpayers’ money that is neither democratic nor governed by principles that support fiscal solidity would move in the direction of political union is totally misleading.
Emu is based on rules enshrined in international treaties. The euro was created as a “depoliticised currency” – its stability entrusted to an independent central bank with a clear mandate to maintain price stability. Any attempt to “save” monetary union via agreements which transfer sovereignty to a European level, where violations of fundamental treaties have become a regular event, lacks any logic. In the end it will only further alienate the people from Europe itself.
A monetary union with a stable euro can only survive if central bank independence is fully respected. This implies that the European Central Bank abstains from fiscal policy actions. Yet to change the “no bail-out” clause ever more in the direction of a bail-out regime is not a step towards a democratically-legitimised political union. It is a move on a slippery road to a regime of fiscal indiscipline drowning hitherto solid countries in the morass of over-indebtedness.
This type of political union would not survive. Its collapse would be brought by resistance from the people. In the past cries of “no taxation without representation” have brought war. This time the consequence would be to threaten the collapse of the most successful project of economic integration in the history of mankind.
The writer is president of the Centre for Financial Studies and a former member of the European Central Bank’s executive board