zwerver zei:
En, themummy123, wat is je commentaar op het artikel? Ik wacht op uw weerlegging van de bewijzen die erin aangehaald worden...
Maar je hebt via PM geen antwoord gegeven op m'n vragen. Heb je het artikel zelf gelezen of niet? Als je aan mij vraagt om moeite te doen om dat eens serieus te lezen, wil ik dat gerust doen, maar dan moet jij het ook doen.
Ondanks het feit dat het artikel afkomstig is van de Armeense Zoryan instituut, ondaks het feit dat Sev-O je uitlacht als je afkomt met Turkse bronnen, heb ik uw Armeense bron gelezen. Ik zou evengoed kunnen verwijzen naar
Tall Armenian Tale waar alles wat in die artikel staat sowieso ontkracht is, maar ik heb het toch nog uitgeprint en rustig gelezen. Heel wat dingen aangeduid waarvan ik zeker wist dat het fout of overdreven waren. Sommige dingen opgezocht en ietsiepietsie nieuwe dingen geleerd.
Ik las de naam van de auteur en die naam zei me wel iets.
Eventjes opgezocht en dit kwam ik tegen:
In more than several pages you accuse Dadrian, a renowned scholar on the Armenian ‘genocide,’ of either of exaggerating the facts or excluding documents. How widespread and ingrained is this attitude among Armenian origin scholars in terms of being selective?
Many Armenian scholars use selective evidence or otherwise distort the historical record, but V.N. Dadrian is in a class by himself. His violations of scholarly ethics, which I document in my book, are so numerous as to destroy his scholarly credentials.
Bron:
No Evidence of Ottoman Intent to Destroy Armenian Community
En hier
hoor je diezelfde beschuldigingen:
http://www.tallarmeniantale.com/pics/professors/lewy-dadrian.wav
Ik verwachtte wel een degelijke artikel. 1tje waarbij de persoon alle mogelijke bewijzen verzamelt en niet selectief tewerk gaat. Maar dit werk van Dadrian is eerder propaganda. Iemand die puur bewijzen verzamelt om zijn statement(genocide) te bewijzen. De waarheid interesseert hem niet.
Maarja, here it goes
Pagina 65:
Having overthrown the opposition Liberal Union government
through a second revolution in January 1913, the CUP eventually gained complete
control of the government. At the same time, the party's Central Committee underwent
a portentous restructuring whereby CUP's radical, xenophobic wing emerged as the
dominant faction. Led by the two physician-politician members of that faction, Be-
haeddin sakir and Mehmed Nazim, and with the support of the party ideologue Ziya
Gdkalp, this faction prevailed in the councils of the Central Committee. The result
was the adoption of a new policy on nationalities and the targeting of the Armenians
as a first priority. The empire was to be purged one way or another of the non-Muslim
elements, and the liquidation of the Armenians at the first opportunity was a central
part of this goal. Implicit and explicit declarations before, during, and after the war
by the members of the CUP triumvirate attest to this preliminary decision.34
Als je dan kijkt naar die voetnoot zie je enkel uit de context gerukte zinnen van Cemal pasha en Talat pasha. Niks over Behaeddin Sakir, Mehmet Nazim of Ziya Gökalp of over enige beslissingen die ze in de comité binnen de CUP genomen hebben. Maw alles wat hier staat, komt niet bepaald overeen met wat er in de voetnoot staat.
The most explicit testimony comes from none other than Richard
Ktihlmann. After serving as a special emissary at the German Embassy in the fall of 1914
and as actual ambassador there from November 1916 to July 1917, and before becom-
ing Germany's foreign minister, Ktihlmann prepared a lengthy "confidential" report in
which he analyzed the wartime fate of Ottoman Armenians for the benefit of German
Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg. In that report, Kiihlmann spoke of "the annihilation
of the Armenians which was carried out on a large-scale" (die in grossem Umfange
durchgefiihrte Armeniervernichtung). He added that this was the result of "a policy
of extermination" (Ausrottungspolitik), which he explained as having crystallized in
connection with "the separatist activities of the Armenians" at a time that Turkey was
near collapse due to the 1912 Balkan war (wdihrend des Balkankrieges, als die Tiirkei
dem Zusammenbruch nahe schien). This policy, he further maintained, was due to "a
policy shift and to a total victory of the Turkish-nationalistic direction in the councils
of CUP."35
Dit zijn meningen/beweringen. Geen feiten. Gelukkig zijn er andere waarnemers(Turk als niet-Turk) die het omgekeerde beweren.
Ik had wel verwacht dat er zulke indirecte bewijzen zou lezen in het artikel...want ja, tot nu toe werden er geen harde directe bewijzen gevonden.
Perhaps the most significant confirmation of premeditation and operational execu-
tion of the premediated plan comes from Colonel Stange. A principal participant in
the guerrilla operations against the Russians, Stange, like Scheubner-Richter, had oc-
casion personally to observe the exterminatory process in the field. He was in charge
of the 8th Infantry Regiment of the 10th Army Corps of the Ottoman Third Army,
whose cadres comprised a large number of former convicts enrolled in the notorious
Special Organization (Teykilati Mahsusa). Behaeddin Sakir, the mastermind and ad-
ministrative chief of the eastern arm of that organization, served for a while under
Stange's command as guerrilla chieftain, and Stange got to know him rather well. To
facilitate his contact with the people around him, Stange was presented by the Direc-
torate of the Special Organization as a Muslim bearing the name Ibrahim Bey. In his
summary "secret" report to the German Military Mission to Turkey dated 23 August
1915, Stange, writing from the headquarters of the Ottoman Third Army at Erzurum,
provided a synopsis of the overall scope and the mechanics of that process. In that
very long report-eight legal-size pages-he stated that the exterminatory measures
were being carried out in accordance with "a plan conceived long time ago" (einen
lang gehegten Plan). He went on to say that these measures of "expulsion and annihi-
lation" (Austreibung und Vernichtung) were the result of a decision made by "the
Young Turk Committee in Istanbul.""38
Laten we eens kijken wat een andere historicus zegt.
The Role of the Teşkilat-i Mahsusa
Several of the courts-martial held in 1919-20 made references to the destructive role of a unit called Teşkilat-i Mahsusa (Special Organization). Many proponents of the Armenian cause accept this accusation. Dadrian described the members of this unit as the main instrument used by the Committee on Union and Progress to carry out its plan to exterminate the Armenians. "Their mission was to deploy in remote areas of Turkey's interior and to ambush and destroy convoys of Armenian deportees,"[24] he wrote. The Special Organization's "principal duty was the execution of the Armenian genocide."[25]
The Special Organization, which developed between 1903 and 1907, only adopted its name in 1913. Under the direction of Enver Pasha and the command of many talented officers, the Special Organization functioned like a special forces outfit. Philip Stoddard, the author of the only full scholarly study of the group, called it "a significant unionist vehicle for dealing with both Arab separatism and Western imperialism." At its peak, it enrolled about 30,000 men. During World War I, the Ottoman command used it for special military operations in the Caucasus, Egypt, and Mesopotamia. In 1915, for example, Special Organization units seized key oases along the Ottoman line of advance against the Suez Canal. The regime also used the Special Organization to suppress "subversion" and "possible collaboration" with the external enemy. However, according to Stoddard, this activity targeted primarily indigenous nationalists in Syria and Lebanon. The Special Organization, he maintained, played no role in the Armenian deportations.[26]
Yet, the main tribunal's indictment accused the Special Organization of carrying out "criminal operations and activities" against the Armenians. According to Dadrian:
“The Ittihadist [Unionist] leaders redeployed the brigand units for use on the home front internally, namely against the Armenians. Through a comprehensive sweep of the major cities, towns, and villages, containing large clusters of Armenian populations, the Special Organization units, with their commanding officers more or less intact, set to work to carry out Ittihad's blueprint of annihilation. [27]”
Turkish as well as German civilian and military sources, Dadrian maintained, confirm this information, including the employment of convicts in Special Organization death squads. But Dadrian's references do not always prove his claims. While the Ottoman government released convicts during World War I in order to increase its manpower pool for military service, there is no evidence beyond the indictment of the main trial for the assertion that the Special Organization, with large numbers of convicts enrolled in its ranks, took the lead role in the massacres. Nor was the presence of convicts abnormal. Use of convicts for military duty in wartime had precedent including use by U.S. and British armies. During World War I, U.S. courts released almost 8,000 men convicted of serious offenses on condition of their induction into military service.[28]
Many of the allegations linking the Special Organization to massacres are based not directly on documents but rather on the sometimes questionable assumptions of those reading them. Dadrian has been among the most prominent scholars making assertions for which the original sources do not allow. He described a link between the Special Organization and the Armenian massacres, but Stange, the German officer who wrote the document in question, never actually mentioned the Special Organization but instead referred to "scum."[29] Nor is there any indication that Stange had any role in the Special Organization, as Dadrian asserted.[30] In view of the tension between Ottoman and German secret services, it would be an unlikely assignment.[31] More likely was that the German Foreign Ministry files were accurate when they described Stange as commanding a detachment of 2,000-3,000 mostly Georgian irregulars who had volunteered to fight the Russians.[32] Another German officer related that the Stange detachment included Armenians,[33] surely a curious fact in the case of a unit said to have been part of an apparatus for the implementation of the Armenian genocide. The question of who carried out the killings of the Armenian deportees is difficult to resolve conclusively. While it may be politically expedient to blame the Special Organization, more likely, the perpetrators were Kurdish tribesmen and corrupt policemen out for booty.[34]
Dadrian has taken similar liberties with a Turkish source that deals with the leading Special Organization official, Eşref Kuşçubasi. At the outbreak of World War I, Eşref was director of Special Organization operations in Arabia, the Sinai, and North Africa. Captured while on a mission to Yemen in early 1917, the British military sent him to Malta where he remained until 1920. British officers interrogated Eşref, but he denied any involvement with the Armenian massacres. He died in 1964 at the age of 91.[35] Dadrian has argued that Eşref admitted participating in the massacres in an interview with the Turkish author Cemal Kutay.[36] Closer inspection, though, reveals Eşref made no such admission. The assertion was instead constructed by selective ellipses and inaccurate paraphrasing.[37] Likewise, despite claims to the contrary, while the indictment of the 1919 court-martial linked the Special Organization to the Armenian massacres, neither the trial's proceedings nor its verdict support the claim. Rather, defendants described the Special Organization's role in covert operations behind Russian lines.[38] Gwynne Dyer, one of the few Western scholars to have done research in the Ottoman military archives, has characterized as "gossip" the assertion that the Special Organization was complicit in the Armenian massacres.[39] The archive of the Turkish General Staff is said to contain ciphered telegrams to the Special Organization,[40] but these documents have not been subject to scholarly inquiry. Until new documents emerge, a link between the Special Organization and the Armenian massacres is nothing but uncorroborated assertion.
Bron:
Revisiting the Armenian Genocide :: Middle East Quarterly
The raising of this issue is an integral part of a broader provocation thesis subsuming
three main categories-namely, individual acts of sabotage, the role of Armenian volunteers in the Russian Caucasus Army, and a series of uprisings. Addressing the matter of sabotage, Erzurum's Vice-Consul Scheubner-Richter in a report confirmed the incidence of isolated acts of sabotage, especially the cutting of telegraphic lines, and espionage; he added, however, that such "phenomena during a war in border areas containing mixed populations is nothing unusual.""
Nothing unusual dus
Nog meer minimaliseren kon gewoonweg niet.
39 Aleppo's consul Walter Rossler
referred in a general way to "the occurrence of potential and actual subversive activi-
ties on the part of Armenians," adding that the authorities "wasted hecatombs of
innocent people for the misdeeds of a few."40 While deploring Armenian acts of dis-
loyalty, Scheubner-Richter sensitized his ambassador to the facts that such acts were
common in all theaters of war and that it was only natural for a population oppressed
and abused by its own government to welcome an advancing enemy of the same faith.41
“oprressed and abused” zegt hij. En dat voor een rijk waar er vóór de tussenkomst van Europa en Rusland nog een Armeense premier was!!! Vandaag de dag weet iedereen wel dat m’n in het Osmaanse Rijk je als vreemdeling heel veel vrijheden had zowel op economisch, cultureel als op religieus vlak. Veel meer dan in Europa alleszinds.
The third category, the most important in the overall scheme of the thesis of provo
cation and backlash, deserves special attention. Was there a general uprising, and so, how widespread was it? As German ambassador Paul Wolff-Metternich wrote a comprehensive report, "There was neither a concerted general uprising, nor was there a fully valid proof that such a synchronized uprising was planned or organized. Moreover, he said, the local uprisings in the summer and fall of 1915 were defensive acts to avert deportation.45
Waren die blind of zo? Eventjes opsommen
1890 – Erzurum en kumkapi rellen
Kum Kapu demonstration - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
1894 – Sasun rellen
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sasun_Resistance_(1894)
1895 -
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeitun_Rebellion_(1895–1896)
1896- Rellen in Van
Defense of Van - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
1896-bankoverval van “Osmanli bank”
1896 Ottoman Bank Takeover - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
1896-Girit rellen
1904-Sasun rellen
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sasun_Uprising_(1904)
1905 – poging om de sultan te vermoorden
Y
1909 – Adana rellen
Erzurum congres in 1914 waar de Osmanen de Armenen autonomie beloven als ze meevechten tegen de Russen, maar de Armenen laten weten dat ze partij voor de Russen kiezen.
Armenian congress at Erzurum - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
1914 – Aanval op gendarme en eisen dat ze niet in het leger willen opgenomen worden.
15/04/1915 Revolte in de buurt van Van. 20/04/1915 bereiken ze Van zelf.
17/04/1915 şatak/çatak rellen
1915: Zeytun rellen
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeitun_Resistance_(1915)
18/04/1915 Bitlis rellen
1915
Shabin-Karahisar uprising - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
1915
Urfa Resistance - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
1915:
Musa Dagh - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Spontaan zeggen ze dan nog. Mooi niet. Alles was georganiseerd.
Social Democrat Hunchakian Party - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Felix Guse, the German chief of staff of the Ottoman Third army and a close collaborator of General Mahmud Kamil, the commander-in-chief of that army in whose command zone 90 percent of the male population reportedly was massacred outright, confirmed this when he wrote that there was no proof that the Armenians had any plan or intention to mount a general uprising46
Als bron geeft Dadrian “Felix Guse, Der Armenieraufstand 1915 und seine Folgen, in: Wissen und Wehr 6, No.10, Berlin, 1925”
En wat zegt een andere over
diezelfde bron
As being in office at the Caucasian front for more that 3 years I could see that, against opposite claims, there was no region in the East, which was overwhelmingly populated by Armenians. Armenians were living in a heterogeneous environment, together with Kurds, Turks and other people, not only in the East but also in the whole of Anatolia. Armenians were more active than Turks in social and economical life and were getting along very well, until the British and the Russians indoctrinated them the idea of nation-state. The Tashnaks did not want separatism from the Ottoman Empire while the Hunchaks started turmoils in the population, which led to the massacres that the Armenians committed towards the Turks at the end of the 19th century.
I witnessed in 1914 in Sivas that the requests of the Armenian Community were fulfilled immediately, whereas the Armenians were simply opposing everything. The Armenian leader Pasdermadjian admitted in his book that the Armenians were secretly arming themselves. At the Tashnak Congress in Erzurum in 1914 Turks offered the Armenians autonomy when they joined the Turkish side and stopped supporting the Russians. The solution that the Turkish government found against the Armenian rebellions was the population-relocation, which intended to resettle the Armenians of Anatolia to Mesopotamia away from the war zones. Of course there were some difficulties during the relocation. But the fact that land and places to live were given to the relocated population, shows the goodwill of the Turks. This goodwill might have been at a minimum in the European sense, still for Eastern standards Turks did the best to comfort the Armenians. During the relocation there were losses, but so-called reports of some Armenians were nothing but propaganda. In these reports exaggeration and repetition of some events can bee observed. The negative events during the relocation were also considered as such by Turkish officials and high punishments were given to persons, who committed these crimes. German Consulate reports show that many governors openly helped Armenians. There is no proof that Turks intended to annihilate the Armenians. Another significant point is the issue of the number of Armenians. The given numbers of Armenians, living in Anatolia are exaggerated. Lepsius says that there were 40.000 Armenians in Erzincan, which is not true, as 20.000 Armenians were living in Erzincan. The claim of genocide is completely incorrect, because at the end of the war there was a big number of Armenians living in Turkey.[1]
[1] Felix Guse, Der Armenieraufstand 1915 und seine Folgen, in: Wissen und Wehr 6, No.10, Berlin, 1925, p.609– 621
Bron:
ERAREN - Institute for Armenian Research
1 bron, 2 verschillende statements. Wie heeft er nu gelijk?
6 For his part, Vice-Consul Scheubner-Richter declared that, except in Van, the uprisings everywhere else involved improvised self-defense.47 Likewise, Vice-Consul Hermann Hoffmann re-
ported that uprisings in Zeitoun, Urfa, Funducak, and Mussa Dagh in his district were spontaneous,48 with Consul R6ssler emphasizing that the Urfa uprising was designed
to avert imminent annihilation,49 and that the memory of the harrowing 1895 Urfa
massacre animated the resolve of the defenders to prevent a recurrence of that night-
mare.50 Moreover, Adana's German Consul Biige twice reported that "all precondi-
tions to mount an Armenian uprising in his district are lacking";5' Samsun's German
Vice-Consul Kuckhoff stated that "the vast majority of the Ottoman Armenians was
not in any way involved in uprisings" (zum griissten Teil... keinen Anteil)52; and
Major-General Posseldt, commandant of Erzurum fortress until April 1915, described
the conduct of the Armenian population of Erzurum as "blameless" (tadellos) and
believed that they were exposed to "harassment and provocation on the part of the 68 Vahakn N. Dadrian
Turks."53 German Ambassador Wangenheim, the architect of the wartime Turko-German
political and military alliance, recognized that a general Armenian rebellion was nei-
ther conceivable nor feasible. In report dated 9 March 1915, he flatly disputed an
Ottoman charge that the Armenians in Bitlis were "in revolt," differentiating such an
idea from individual acts of resistance to deportation
Het was allesbehalve spontaan. De opstanden zijn begonnen sinds de Turks-Russische oorlogen. Steeds zaten daar de Dahsnak Dashnak - Wikipedia en meestal de Hunchak erachter Social Democrat Hunchakian Party - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Pagina 70:
In November 1914-long before the Third Army suffered a crushing defeat at Sarikamis (January 1915), and long before the Armenian Van uprising occurred (April-May 1915)-the brigands (Vetes) of the newly formed Special Organization (TerkilUtlt Mahsusa) were busy in the eastern provinces, especially Erzurum, assaulting, raping, pillaging, and murdering Arme-
nians. The first signal of the existence of such a scheme was relayed to Berlin by
German Ambassador Wangenheim, who transmitted to Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg
a 5 December 1914 report by Captain Paul Schwartz, then his consul at Erzurum.
Detailing the provocations of the brigands (Freischiirler), including the perpetration of
murder, the consul spoke of the acute alarm of "the Armenian population of Erzurum,
especially the rural population," who believed these provocations to be the "harbingers
of new massacres" (Vorboten neuer Massakres).
Ivm de “Special organization”(Teşkilatı Mahsusa) had ik reeds een antwoord gegeven. Scrol terug naar boven, of je kunt gewoon direct naar de bron gaan Revisiting the Armenian Genocide :: Middle East Quarterly scrollen naar “The Role of the Teşkilat-i Mahsusa”
6 In the June 1915-October 1918 period, four successive German ambassadors explicitly characterized the anti- Armenian measures as devices to "solve the Armenian question through annihilation"; of these, three quoted directly Interior Minister Tilat to this effect.7
En wat bleek achteraf? Dat die mannen overdreven. Achteraf waren er nog steeds Armenen en dat zelfs in grote aantallen.
There were 1,465 million Armenians in Ottoman Anatolia in
1912, before the wars began. (This does not include the 28,000
Armenian residents of Southern Haleb Province, which became
part of Syria after the world war nor the Armenians of istanbul
Province and Ottoman Europe, who were neither killed nor
deported during World War I, although some were conscripted.) At
wars' end, 881,000 remained alive, a loss of 584,000, or 41%.
21
Most of these were victims of the war fought between the Muslims
and Armenians between 1915 and 1920, directly or indirectly
through starvation and disease. To put the Armenian loss into
perspective, it should be noted that the Muslims of the war zone
suffered equally horrific loss: The Muslim population of the Van
Province decreased by 62%, that of Bitlis by 42%, that of Erzurum
by 31%. Not coincidentally, these were the provinces of greatest
conflict between Ottoman and Russian armies and between
Muslim and Armenian civilians.
bron: http://www.armenian-history.com/books/Arm-pop-Ottoman-Emp.pdf
Dadrian over Bernstorf memoires:
In his memoirs Johan Bernstorf, the last ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, declared that when he kept “pestering” Talat on the Armenian question, Talat reportedly retorted, "[the Armenian] question is settled," which the ambassador explained in terms of the CUP scheme of "systematically trying to exterminate" the Armenians
Johann Bernstorff, Memoirs of Count Bernstorf (New York: Random House, 1936), 176, 374.”
Wederom uit de context gerukt.
Hier heb je de volledige versie:
“In this connection an excellent instance is the Grand Vizier, Talaat Pasha, subsequently murdered by an Armenian in Berlin, whom I learnt to respect and liked during my service in Constantinople. A man of absolute integrity, he had unusual gifts that enabled him to climb the steep ascent from the position of telegraph official to that of leading statesman, and a statesman he was in the truest sense of the word. There was not a sign of the parvenu in his behaviour or ideas. As Grand Vizier, Talaat Pasha always gave the impression of a ‘grand seigneur’, and his political conceptions were unencumbered by any pettiness. I never knew any Turk who could fairly be compared with him. He did indeed often promise me more than he could perform. […] However that may be, Talaat usually recognized the right way, and as time went on — and especially after every visit to Europe, he became more of a match for his mighty task. If any statesman could have succeeded in reforming the old Ottoman Empire, it would have been Talaat Pasha, provided that he had been able to consolidate his power and influence. As I have mentioned above, I am not referring to the Turkish Republic of today, with which I unfortunately have no acquaintance.
This constant and considerable contrast between desire and achievement induced in the Grand Vizier a delightful blend of skepticism and gentle cynicism, which increased the charm of that attractive personality. When I kept on pestering him about the Armenian question, he once said with a smile: ‘What on earth do you want? The question is settled, there are no more Armenians,’ a reply which, while admitting his own complicity in the crime, hinted that the European accounts might be exaggerated.”
Bron: The Misuse of "Memoirs of Count Bernstorff” in Armenian Nationalist Publications
Mss is het tijd om eens aandachtig de andere kant van de medaille eens te lezen?
Armenian Massacres: New Records Undercut Old Blame: Reexamining History :: Middle East Quarterly
Revisiting the Armenian Genocide :: Middle East Quarterly
Arend Jan Boekestijn - PDF
Justin Mccarthy – Muslim and minorities
Amazon.com: The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide (Utah Series in Turkish and Islamic Stud) (9780874808490): Guenter Lewy: Books
Maar soit, het minimumloon in Turkije als € 331, die hoger was dan het minimumloon in negen lidstaten van de Europese Unie, namelijk Bulgarije (€ 92), Roemenië (€ 114), Letland (€ 172), Litouwen ( € 174), Slowakije (€ 217), Estland (€ 230), Polen (€ 246), Hongarije (€ 258) en Tsjechië (€ 288), terwijl minder dan het minimumloon in Portugal (€ 470).[27]
, in Ankara. An article titled ‘‘The Local Administration of the Special Organization in Trabzon Province,’’ uses an official Ottoman document from the ATASE archive, from which we learn that Stange was appointed chief of the SO units in Trabzon region in March 1915, replacing the above-mentioned Yusuf Rıza.35