The Russian
Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C³I) performed poorly during the conflict.
[357] The Russian communication systems were outdated, with a 58th Army commander allegedly making contact with his combat troops via a journalist-owned satellite phone.
[357] Without the modern
GLONASS, precision-guided munitions could not be used and the US-controlled
GPS was unavailable, since the war zone was blacked out.
[357] Due to the negligence of Russian defence minister, the use of
unmanned aerial vehicles was not sanctioned;
[357] an
RIA Novosti editorial said that Russian forces were without reliable aerial-reconnaissance systems, once using a Tupolev Tu-22M3 bomber instead.
[364] However, Russian reconnaissance battalions and regiments were also deployed during the war.
[365] Deputy chief of the General staff of Russia, General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, said that in the conflict new weapons were not tried out.
[366]
The RIA Novosti editorial also said that Russian Su-25 ground-attack jets did not have radar vision and ground-target coordinate computing. They also did not have long-range surface-to-air missiles that could be fired beyond the air-defence zones of an adversary.
[364] Opposition-affiliated Russian analyst Konstantin Makienko observed the substandard conduct of the Russian Air Force: "It is totally unbelievable that the Russian Air Force was unable to establish air superiority almost to the end of the five-day war, despite the fact that the enemy had no fighter aviation".
[182]
According to Russian expert Anton Lavrov, on 8 August, Russian and South Ossetian troops deployed in South Ossetia were unaware that Russian aviation was involved in the war. Russian troops and South Ossetians often assessed Russian aircraft as enemy and shot at them before precise identification took place.
[367] On 8 August, the air force performed 63 flights in support of Russian ground troops.
[368] A total of six Russian warplanes were lost during the war: one Su-25SM, two Su-25BMs, two Su-24Ms and one
Tu-22M3; friendly fire was the cause of the loss of three aircraft.
[369] Lavrov denies that the shot-down Tu-22M was being used for reconnaissance.
[370]
Communication between the
North Caucasus Military District commander and the air force was poor and their roles were unclear. Colonel-General
Aleksandr Zelin, commander-in-chief of the Air Force, did not set foot in the command post, instead running Air-force operations on a mobile phone from his workroom without any help from his air-defence aides. The air force was blamed of rendering no assistance to land campaign.
[357]
Swedish analysts Carolina Vendil Pallin and Fredrik Westerlund said that although the Russian Black Sea Fleet did not meet significant resistance, it proved effective at implementing elaborate operations.
[371] Mechanised infantry opened a new front in Abkhazia, which contributed to the quickness of the Russian military success.
[357]
Heritage Foundation researchers said in their assessment of the preparation of Russian general-staff that the manoeuvres were planned and implemented effectively, with a crucial confusion being engineered by the Russians.
[350] A Reuters analyst described Russia's army as "strong but flawed"; the war demonstrated that Russia's "armed forces have emerged from years of neglect as a formidable fighting force, but revealed important deficiencies." He stated that Russia fell short of its role of a first-rate military power due to these faults.
[372] Unlike the
Second Chechen War, Russia's force in Georgia was composed primarily of professional soldiers instead of conscripts.
[373] Reuters journalists in Georgia stated that they found the Russian forces to be well-outfitted and orderly forces. CAST director
Ruslan Pukhov said that "the victory over the Georgian army ... should become for Russia not a cause for euphoria and excessive joy, but serve to speed up military transformations."
[372] Roger McDermott wrote that slight dissimilarity in criticism by civilian and official references after the conflict was "an orchestrated effort by the government to 'sell' reform to the military and garner support among the populace."
[357]
The evolution of the Russian Army into a professional force was not deemed as fruitful. In September 2008, General
Vladimir Boldyrev acknowledged that many of the professional soldiers did not have better training than the conscripts. Most of the land combat warfare was conducted by
Russian Airborne Troops and special troops. Due to the failure of the Russian Air Force to penetrate Georgian air defence, airborne troops could not be airlifted behind Georgian lines. A surprise attack on a land-forces commander, in which only five of thirty vehicles in his convoy made it, demonstrated information-gathering negligence. Many Russian land units reportedly were short of ammo.
[362]
. Als hij bv verkrijgt dat Westen het Krim als Rusland beschouwt en hij die republieken kan behouden kan het zijn dat hij gelukkig is.
