Toch een opmerkelijke bekentenis van Graham in het boek Little book of common sense investing
Graham was also well aware that the superior rewards he
had reaped using his valuation principles would be difficult
to achieve in the future. In that 1976 interview, he made this
remarkable concession, “I am no longer an advocate of elab-
orate techniques of security analysis in order to find superior
value opportunities. This was a rewarding activity, say, 40
years ago, but the situation has changed a great deal since
then. In the old days, any well-trained security analyst could
do a good professional job of selecting undervalued issues
through detailed studies; but in the light of the enormous
amount of research now being carried on, I doubt whether
in most cases such extensive efforts will generate sufficiently
superior selections to justify their cost.”
Straddle,
Ik heb "The intelligent investor" dit weekend uitgelezen. Geen slecht boek, maar het maakt op mij nu ook niet bepaald een verpletterende indruk. Ik kan wel begrijpen dat dit voor Buffett wel zo was. Hij stond aan de start van zijn beleggingscarrière en Graham's inzichten zijn voor hem bepalend geweest voor de rest van zijn leven. Heden zijn er echter heel veel goede beleggingsboeken te lezen, maar in die tijd was waarschijnlijk zowel het aanbod als ook het niveau een pak lager dan wat je nu in de rekken vindt.
Voor mij persoonlijk zijn die boeken van Bogle het meest inspirrerend geweest. En ik denk voor elke indexbelegger.
Over the long term, stock market returns are cre-
ated by real investment returns earned by real busi-
nesses—the annual dividend yield on publicly held
U.S. corporations, plus their subsequent rate of
earnings growth.
2. Over the short run, illusory speculative returns,
caused by the impact of the change in the amount
investors are willing to pay for each dollar of corpo-
rate earnings, can increase or decrease investment
returns. But in the long run, the impact of specula-
tive return washes out.
(q1: : In investing, the winning strategy for
reaping the rewards of capitalism depends on own-
ing businesses, not trading stocks.)
3. Individual businesses come and go. Given the rapid
pace of technological change we face today, along
with powerful new global competition, the failure
rate of individual corporations is hardly likely to
falter and may well increase.
The best protection for individual investors
from the risks inherent in individual stocks is the
broadest possible diversification.
(Q2: : Owning businesss in the aggregate
through an all-market index fund is the consum-
mate risk-reduction strategy. (Broad economic
risks to corporate earnings and dividends, however,
cannot be diversified away.)
4. As a group, all investors in the stock market earn
its gross returns. When the market provides an 8
percent return, investors divide up 8 percent
(before taking account of costs). What else is new?
5. While investors earn the market’s entire return,
they do not capture the market’s entire return.
Rather, they capture the market’s return only after
the costs of financial intermediation are deducted—
commissions, management fees, marketing costs,
sales loads, administrative expenses, legal expenses
and custodial fees, and so on. Unnecessary taxes
simply enlarge the gap.
(Q3: : Gross market return, minus costs,
equals net return for investors as a group. (Again,
remember the Gotrocks family.)
6. While all investors as a group must earn the mar-
ket’s net return, mutual fund investors, betrayed by
their emotions (and by the fund industry) into seri-
ous errors in market timing and fund selection,
have done much worse. While that gap may shrink,
itisvirtuallyinconceivablethatitwillbeeliminated.
(Q4: : Gross market return, minus costs,
minus timing and selection penalties, equals the net
return earned by mutual fund investors as a group.)
.